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Abstract
Due to the sensitivity of the information required to detect network intrusions efficiently, collecting huge amounts of network transactions
is inevitable and the volume and details of network transactions available in recent years have been high. The meta-heuristic anomaly based
assessment is vital in an exploratory analysis of intrusion related network transaction data. In order to forecast and deliver predictions about
intrusion possibility from the available details of the attributes involved in network transaction. In this regard, a meta-heuristic assessment model
called the feature correlation analysis and association impact scale is explored to estimate the degree of intrusion scope threshold from the optimal
features of network transaction data available for training. With the motivation gained from the model called “network intrusion detection by
feature association impact scale” that was explored in our earlier work, a novel and improved meta-heuristic assessment strategy for intrusion
prediction is derived. In this strategy, linear canonical correlation for feature optimization is used and feature association impact scale is explored
from the selected optimal features. The experimental result indicates that the feature correlation has a significant impact towards minimizing the
computational and time complexity of measuring the feature association impact scale.
c⃝ 2016 The Korean Institute of Communications Information Sciences. Publishing Services by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under
the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) are mostly of two types:
misuse IDSs and anomaly IDSs. A misuse IDS identifies intru-
sions based on parameters of known attacks and system weak-
nesses. It however does not recognize new or unfamiliar kinds
of attacks. An anomaly IDS is based on the parameters of nor-
mal behavior and uses them for identifying any action that
strays considerably from normal behavior. The mechanism of
misuse intrusion detection trains on the existing patterns of in-
trusion and matches the data considered for examination with
previous patterns to identify intrusions whereas, anomaly intru-
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nation data of normal usage.
IDSs that are efficient in nature are usually developed uti-
lizing data mining techniques owing to their excellent perfor-
mance of detecting intrusions and capability of generalization.
However the process of implementing and installing such sys-
tems is complicated in nature. The inherent complications of the
systems could be organized into separate problem sets based on
the parameters of accuracy, competence, and usability. A key
problem associated with IDSs built using data mining tech-
niques, and mostly with those techniques based on anomaly
detection is that they show a higher percent of false positive oc-
currences compared to the previous detection techniques based
on hand-crafted signature. Hence, processing of audit data and
detection of intrusions on-line are difficult for these techniques.
Furthermore, compared to existing methodologies these tech-
niques require vast training data and great complexity is asso-
ciated with the learning process of the system. The key idea
of the approach is to apply heuristic technique to anomaly
based intrusion detection. The heuristic approach tends to de-
fine a scale that helps to assess the significance of the network
es. Publishing Services by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the
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dimensionality reduction for reducing the features extracted and
feature selection. Feature extraction involves using all the fea-
tures with transformation which comprises a combination of
all the initial features. During feature selection, features are se-
lected according to the classification criteria.
2. Related work
Eduardo DelaHoz et al. [1] proposed a classification ap-
proach that combines statistical techniques and self-organizing
maps for detecting the anomalies in the network. Principal com-
ponent analysis (PCA) and Fisher’s discriminant ratio are used
for feature selection and noise removal and probabilistic self-
organizing maps are used to classify the network transactions
as normal or anomalous. Ujwala Ravale et al. [2] proposed a
hybrid technique that combines data mining approaches. The
K-means clustering algorithm is used to decrease the number
of attributes associated with each data point and the Radial ba-
sis function (RBF) kernel of support vector machine (SVM) is
used for classification. Gaikward et al. [3] proposed a machine
learning approach for implementing the IDS. The genetic algo-
rithm is used to reduce the dimensions in the feature set and
the partial decision tree is used as a base classifier to implement
the IDS. Sunil Nilkanth Pawar et al. [4] proposed a genetic al-
gorithm based network IDS with variable length chromosomes.
A chromosome with relevant features is used for rule genera-
tion. An effective fitness function is used to define the fitness of
each rule. Each chromosome has one or more rules for efficient
detection of anomalies. Fangjun Kuang et al. [5] proposed a
novel SVM model by combining kernel PCA (KPCA) with im-
proved chaotic particle swarm optimization. KPCA is applied
as a preprocessor of SVM to reduce the dimension of feature
vectors and shorten training time and improved chaotic particle
swarm optimization is proposed to estimate whether the action
is normal or intrusion. Iftikhar Ahmad et al. [6] proposed an ap-
proach that used PCA for feature subset selection that is based
on eigenvalues. Instead of using a traditional approach of se-
lecting features with the highest eigenvalues such as PCA, the
authors applied genetic principal components to select the sub-
set of features and SVM for classification. Chun Guo et al. [7]
proposed a hybrid learning method, named distance sum-based
SVM (DSSVM), for modeling an effective IDS. In DSSVM, the
distance sum based on the correlation between each data sam-
ple and the cluster centers feature dimensions in the data set is
obtained and SVM is used as a classifier. Saurabh Mukherjee
et al. [8] proposed a feature vitality based reduction method to
identify important features used to detect the anomalies in the
selection system, and applied the naive Bayes classifier to de-
tect the anomalies in the IDS.
3. Data set description
The data set developed by Lee and Stolfo et al. [9], KDD-
99 is an extensively used data set and is commonly selected for
the evaluation of anomaly detection. The data generated from
the Intrusion Detection Evaluation DARPA program 1998 wasused to build the original KDD-99 data set [10,11] that com-
prises close to 4,900,000 unique connection vectors, where ev-
ery connection vector consists of 41 features of which 34 are
continuous features and 7 are discrete features. The NSL-KDD
[12,13] data set is a polished version of its predecessor KDD-99
data set. As the NSL-KDD data set comprises a huge quantity
of data, for experimental purpose sample data from the Kdd-
cup.data 10 percent.gz is taken for the purpose of training. The
NSL-KDD data set considered for training is 10% of the main
data set equaling 494,020 connection vectors and labeled either
as normal or as attack. The activities that show variations with
respect to ‘normal network behavior’ are considered not ‘nor-
mal’ and labeled as attacks [14] and the records corresponding
to normal behavior are labeled as normal. The attacks simu-
lated in our experiments belong to any of the four types [15]
described below:
1. Denial of service attack (DOS): The DOS attack is a type
of attack where an attacker blocks access to valid users by
consuming the resources of computer or memory making the
system unable to handle valid requests. Examples of DOS
attacks are many such as ‘teardrop,’ ‘neptune,’ ‘ping of death
(pod),’ ‘mail bomb’, ‘back’, ‘smurf’ and ‘land’.
2. Users-to-root attack (U2R): The root attack is a type of
attack where the attacker gains access to a valid user account
in the system and based on existing system weaknesses
acquires access to the systems root component. There are
several types of U2R attacks such as ‘load-module’, ‘buffer
overflow’, ‘rootkit’, ‘perl’.
3. Remote-to-local attack (R2L): The remote-to-local attack
is a type of attack where an attacker without an account,
accesses locally a legitimate user account based on existing
machine vulnerabilities. R2L attacks types are ‘phf’,
‘warezmaster’, ‘warezclient’, ‘spy’, ‘imap’, ‘ftp write’,
‘multihop’ and ‘guess passwd’.
4. Probing attack (PROBE): The probing attack is an attack
type where an attacker evades the security and collects data
on the computers in the network. The PROBE attacks types
are ‘nmap’, ‘satan’, ‘ipsweep’ and ‘portsweep’.
In the NSL-KDD data set the protocols taken into account are
TCP, UDP, and ICMP.
4. Data set preprocessing
The network transactions set contains 42 features with
values of type continuous and categorical. To facilitate the
optimization process, these values should be numeric and
categorical. Henceforth, initially all alphanumeric values have
to be converted to numeric values and then the continuous
values need to be converted to categorical.
4.1. The procedure to represent the alphanumeric values as
numeric values and continuous values as categorical values
• Consider each feature with alphanumeric values and then list
all possible unique values and list them with an incremental
index that begins at 1.
• Replace the values with their appropriate indexes.
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Binary representation of the association between T and V .
val1 val2 val3 val4 val5 val6 val7 val8
tvs1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 (val1, val6, val8)
tvs2 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 (val2, val5, val6, val8)
tvs3 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 (val1, val2, val3, val7)
tvs4 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 (val7)
tvs5 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 (val4, val6, val7, val8)
tvs6 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 (val1, val2, val3, val4, val7)Fig. 1. An example weighted graph of categorical values set of count 8.
• Consider each feature with continuous values, and then
partition them into a set of ranges with min and max values,
such that the transactions are distributed evenly through all
these ranges.
4.2. Feature optimization for anomaly based intrusion detec-
tion
The preprocessed set of network transactions are partitioned
based on their labels, such that normal transactions are one set,
DOS attack transactions are another set and so on.
Consider each feature values set fiv(NTS) in the resultant
normal transactions set (NTS) and their coverage percentage as
fiv = { fi (v1, c1), fi (v2, c2), fi (v3, c3), fi (v4, c4), . . . . . . ,
fi (v j , c j )}.
Then the feature optimization for each attack Ak can be
performed as described in the following steps:
• Consider transactions set ts(Ak) representing attack type Ak
(as an example, consider the attack called DOS).
• For each feature fi (Ak), consider all values as a set fiv(Ak).
Create an empty set fiv of size | fiv(Ak)|, and fill it with
values from fiv according to their coverage percentage such
that | fiv(Ak)| ∼= | fiv|. Here | fiv(Ak)| represents the size of
the feature values set of fi (Ak).
• This process is recommended to prepare the feature values
vector fiv of the NTS, such that fiv is compatible toFig. 2. Duplex graph between STVS and V .
‘ fiv(Ak)’ towards size and that also represents the coverage
ratio of the values in fiv(NTS).
• This process should be applied for all feature values set in
network transactions of attack Ak .
• Find the canonical correlation between fiv(Ak) and fiv.
If the resultant canonical correlation is less than the given
threshold or zero, then feature fi (Ak) can be considered as
optimal towards assessing the scale of intrusion scope.
According to the procedure explained in the above steps, the
optimal features of the specific attack Ak can be identified.
4.3. Canonical correlation analysis
Two multidimensional data sets X and Y are considered
and linear relationships between the data sets are established
with the auto covariance and cross-covariance matrices of the
second order with standard statistical technique based CCA.
The technique is based on finding two bases, one each for data
sets X and Y, where the matrix of cross-correlation becomes
diagonal, and correlations of the diagonal are maximized.
The parameters used for implementing the canonical
correlations are studied [16,17], where, X and Y data vectors
should be of equal number; however data vectors x ∈ X and
y ∈ Y may have varying dimensions assuming the mean is
zero. The canonical correlations computation is solved using
the equations of eigenvector.
C−1xx CxyC−1yy Cyxwx = ρ2wx
C−1yy CyxC−1xx Cxywy = ρ2wy (1)
106 V. Jyothsna, V.V. Rama Prasad / ICT Express 2 (2016) 103–116Fig. 3. Canonical correlation of different labels towards normal data.Here, Cyx = E{yxT } where ρ2 or eigenvalues are the square
of canonical correlations and wx and wx or the eigenvectors
are normalized CCA basis vectors. The solutions to theequations are equivalent to non-zero value whose numbers are
equivalent to x and y a vector with lesser dimensional value is
considered.
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The matrix representation of the edge weights in duplex graph (values rounded
to a near value).
0.34 0 0 0 0 0.67 0 0.67
0 0.52 0 0 0.52 0.84 0 0.84
1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0.67 0 0.84 0.67 0.84
1.17 1.17 1.17 0.84 0 0 1.34 0
Canonical correlations Cxx and Cyy are both converted to
unit matrices. As Cyx = CTxy , Eq. (1) is converted to,
CxyC
T
xywx = ρ2wx
CyxC
T
yxwy = ρ2wy . (2)
These equations depicting the singular value decomposition
[18,19] of the cross-covariance matrix Cxy
Cxy = UΣV T =
L
i=1
ρiuiv
T
i . (3)
Here U and V represent orthogonal square matrices (U TU =
I, VT V = I ) comprising ui and vi representing singular vec-
tors. In this approach, the singular vectors considered are wxi
and wyi that represent basis vectors delivering canonical corre-
lations. MatricesU and V and the subsequent ui and vi singular
vectors dimensionalities usually vary according to the varied di-
mensions of x and y data vectors.
Σ =

D 0
0 0

(4)
The pseudo diagonal matrix includes diagonal matrix D com-
prising singular values equal to non-zero and attached with zero
matrices which makes the matrix Σ compatible with various
dimensions of x any y. The non-zero singular values are basi-
cally the nonzero canonical correlations whose number is less
than any of x and y data vectors dimensions if Cxy or the cross-
covariance matrix has full rank.
5. Intrusion detection by feature association impact scale
The approach of measuring feature association support (fas)
metric proposed initially considers the network transactionTable 3
Transpose representation of the matrix.
0.34 0 1 0 0 1.17
0 0.52 1 0 0 1.17
0 0 1 0 0 1.17
0 0 0 0 0.67 0.84
0 0.52 0 0 0 0
0.67 0.84 0 0 0.84 0
0 0 1 0 0.67 1.34
0.67 0.84 0 0 0.84 0
records of the given training set and feature categorical values
used in those network transactions as two independent sets and
further builds a duplex graph between these two.
5.1. Assumptions
The features { f 1, f 2, f 3, . . . . . . , f n∀ fi = { fiv1, fiv2,
..... fivm}}, are categorical values and optimal to a specific
attack Ak , which are selected through canonical correlation
analysis applied on the set of network transactions T (Ak). Here
T (Ak) is the set of network transaction records of specific
attack Ak of the given training set such that
T = {t1, t2, t3, . . . . . . tn∀ti = {val( f1), val( f2), .....val( fi ),
val( fi+1), .....val( fn)}}.
The set of categorical values of features belonging to each
network transaction will be considered as transaction value set
tvs, and all transaction value sets are referred as ‘STVS’.
In above description val( fi ) can be defined as val( fi ) ∈
{ fiv1, fiv2.... fivm}; hereafter, the term feature refers the
current categorical value of the feature. The two features
‘val( fi )’ and ‘val( f j )’, ‘val( fi )’ connected with ‘val( f j )’ if
and only if (val( fi ), val( f j )) ∈ tvsk .
5.2. Process
To explore the process by an example, consider the total
number of divergent values of features as 8 and represented as
a set V = {val1, val2, . . . .val8} and |T | as 6, here, |T | is size
of the network transaction records. In Table 1 and Fig. 2, each
element {val1, val2, . . . .val8} can be fiv j such that { fiv j∃i ∈
[1, 2, . . . . . . n] ∧ j ∈ [1, 2, .....m]}.
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divergent canonical correlation threshold value.
Fig. 6. Process time complexity optimization observed for FCAAIS over FAIS.
Fig. 7. Process completion time optimization observed for FCAAIS over FAIS.
In the process of detecting the association of each feature
categorical value fiv j referred as valk with network transaction
records, initially build a duplex graph between transaction value
sets STVS and the feature categorical values V (Fig. 3).
The formation of a duplex graph is considered as the graph
relations are bipartite, and edges are formed between features
and transaction value sets. Each relation in this graph indicates
the role of a feature towards a network transaction. An edge
between a transaction value set tvs and a feature f is possible
if and only if that feature f is the part of tvs. This can be
represented as etvs← f ∃ f ∈ tvs.
In the weighted undirected graph (Fig. 1) representing a
weighted graph with values of features as vertices and edges
between the values of features. An edge between any twoTable 4
Canonical correlation of the fields of PROBE category under divergent labels
against normal data.
Attack type
IPSWEEP NMAP PORTSWEEP
Duration 0 0 0
protocol type 0.965589 1 0
Service 0.304748 0.346288 0
Flag 0.575125 0.755122 0
src bytes 0.323796 0.433333 0
dst bytes 0.049496 0 0
Land 1 1 1
wrong fragment 1 1 1
urgent 1 1 1
Hot 0 0 0
num failed logins 1 1 1
logged in 1 0 0
num compromised 1 1 1
root shell 0 0 0
su attempted 1 1 1
num root 1 1 1
num file creations 0 0 0
num shells 1 1 1
num access files 0 0 0
num outbound cmds 1 1 1
is host login 1 1 1
is guest login 0 0 0
count 0.717419 0.249187 0
srv count 0.379226 0.608943 0
serror rate 0 0 0
srv serror rate 0 0 0
rerror rate 1 0 1
srv rerror rate 1 0 1
same srv rate 0.9999 1 1
diff srv rate 0 0 0
srv diff host rate 0.177373 0.413273 0
dst host count 0.150618 0.483868 0
dst host srv count 0.846976 0.618582 0
dst host same srv rate 0.967212 0.725555 0
dst host diff srv rate 0.280452 0.077617 1
dst host same src port rate 0.324168 0.36744 0
dst host srv diff host rate 0.497923 0.680034 0
dst host serror rate 0 0 0
dst host srv serror rate 0 0 0
dst host rerror rate 1 0 1
dst host srv rerror rate 1 1 1
features val( f1), val( f2) will be weighted as follows:
ctvs = 0;
foreach {tvs∀tvs ∈ STVS}
ctvs+ = {1∀(val( f1), val( f2)) ⊆ tvs}.
(5)
In the above equation, ctvs indicates the count of transactions,
which contains both features val( f1), val( f2). Then the edge
weight between features val( f1) and val( f2) can be measured
as follows.
w(val( f1)↔ val( f2)) = ctvs|STVS| (6)
In the process of building a weighted graph we consider that an
edge between any two features exists if and only if ctvs ≥ 1.
In the duplex graph (Fig. 2), the dotted line represents that
the connected elements belong to the same level of the duplex
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Optimal features of PROBE Category (less than the mean of the CC value).Table 6
Canonical correlation of the fields of DOS category under divergent labels against normal data.
Attack category: DOS
Attack type Back Land Neptune POD Smurf Teardrop
Duration 0 0 0 0 0 0
protocol type 0.973671824 0.932007 0 0.971684 0 0.972549
Service 0.304189382 0.31321 0 0.359382 0 0.303898
Flag 0.930959282 0.872872 0 0.983801 0 0.96171
src bytes 0.418457014 0 0 0.735404 0 0.479463
dst bytes 0.474984388 0 0 0 0 0.007766
Land 1 0 1 1 1 1
wrong fragment 1 1 1 1 1 0
Urgent 1 1 1 1 1 1
Hot 0.06047447 0 0 0 0 0
num failed logins 1 1 1 1 1 1
logged in 0.98836241 0 0 0 0 0
num compromised 1 1 1 1 1 1
root shell 0 0 0 0 0 0
su attempted 1 1 1 1 1 1
num root 1 1 1 1 1 1
num file creations 0 0 0 0 0 0
num shells 1 1 1 1 1 1
num access files 0 0 0 0 0 0
num outbound cmds 1 1 1 1 1 1
is host login 1 1 1 1 1 1
is guest login 0 0 0 0 0 0
Count 0.646676093 0.151103 0 0.639281 0 1
srv count 0.659146826 0.697969 0 0.662611 0 1
serror rate 0 0.07359 0 0 0 0
srv serror rate 0 0.218218 0 0 0 0
rerror rate 1 1 0 0 0 0
srv rerror rate 1 0 0 0 0 0
same srv rate 0.999733481 0.974774 0 0.999527 0 1
diff srv rate 0 0.996815 0 0 0 0
srv diff host rate 0.20949181 0.394435 0 0.249303 0 0
dst host count 1 0.303341 0 0.422084 0 0.780417
dst host srv count 1 0.883352 0 0.686862 0 0.828144
(continued on next page)
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Attack category: DOS
Attack type Back Land Neptune POD Smurf Teardrop
dst host same srv rate 0.994114036 0.942695 0 0.852949 0 0.833876
dst host diff srv rate 0 0.586353 0 0.0161 0 0.014048
dst host same src port rate 0.057398167 0.264927 0 0.198461 0 0.236948
dst host srv diff host rate 0 0.570761 0 1 0 0
dst host serror rate 0.056962968 0.028009 0 0 0 0
dst host srv serror rate 0.036273813 0.29177 0 0 0 0
dst host rerror rate 1 0.650791 0 0 0 0
dst host srv rerror rate 1 1 0 0 1 1Table 7
Optimal features of DOS category (less than the mean of the CC value).
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Canonical correlation of the fields of U2R category under divergent labels against normal data.
Attack category: U2R
Attack type Buffer overflow Load module Perl Rootkit
Duration 0.06468 0 0.603172 0
Protocol type 0.947758 0.932007 0.870388 1
Service 0.26415 0.31321 0.598528 0.599632
Flag 0.750583 0.872872 0.816497 0.822192
src bytes 0.701439 0 0.988761 0.52679
dst bytes 0.183606 0 0.820712 0.193833
Land 1 0 1 1
wrong fragment 1 1 1 1
urgent 1 1 1 1
Hot 0.214286 0 0 0
num failed logins 1 1 1 1
logged in 1 0 1 1
num compromised 1 1 1 1
root shell 1 0 0.57735 1
su attempted 1 1 1 1
num root 1 1 0 1
num file creations 0 0 0.57735 0
num shells 1 1 0 1
num access files 0 0 0 0
num outbound cmds 1 1 1 1
is host login 1 1 1 1
is guest login 0 0 0 0
Count 0.150811 0.151103 0.796662 0.816236
srv count 0.548471 0.697969 0.66472 0.834614
serror rate 0 0.07359 0 0
srv serror rate 0 0.218218 0 0
rerror rate 0 1 0 0
srv rerror rate 1 0 0 0
same srv rate 1 0.974774 0.96225 0.987763
diff srv rate 0 0.996815 0 0
srv diff host rate 0 0.394435 0 0
dst host count 0.570181 0.303341 0.993878 0.521379
dst host srv count 0.463404 0.883352 0.843733 0.466736
dst host same srv rate 0.999838 0.942695 0.735718 0.545537
dst host diff srv rate 0 0.586353 0.312348 0
dst host same src port rate 0.239158 0.264927 0.042818 0.331178
dst host srv diff host rate 0.392318 0.570761 0 0.377964
dst host serror rate 0 0.028009 0 0
dst host srv serror rate 0 0.29177 0 0
dst h
0.342997 0.650791 1 0
ost rerror rate
dst host srv rerror rate 1 1 0 0graph, and the solid line indicates the relation between a feature
value and transaction value set. If a feature categorical value
fiv j referred as val1 exists in tvs1 then the weight of the
connection between val1 and tvs1 will be the sum of the weights
of the edges between val1 and each feature categorical value
{ fiv j∃ fiv j ∈ tvs1} of tvs1 that is defined in the weighted
graph.
Further, a matrix A will be formed that represents the edge
weights of the duplex graph between transaction value sets and
feature categorical values. Then A′, the transpose of matrix A
is obtained.
Consider STVS as a database and depict it as a duplex graph
without loss of information. Let STVS = {tvs1, tvs2, . . . ., tvs6}
be a list of transaction value sets and V = {val1, val2, . . . .val8}
be the corresponding set of feature categorical values. Then,clearly STVS is equivalent to the duplex-graph DG =
(STVS, V, E).
Here, E = {(tvsi , val j ) : val j ∈ tvsi , tvsi ∈ STVS, val j ∈
V }.
Assuming transaction value sets of the given duplex graph
as pivots and the feature categorical values as pure prerogatives,
the pivot and prerogative values can be measured as follows:
The matrix representation of transaction value sets and fea-
ture connections is represented as matrix ‘A’ (see Table 2). The
value represents the sum of edge weights between a prerogative
feature categorical value and other feature categorical values of
the target pivot, which is a transaction value set.
If a feature categorical value val1 exists in transaction value
set tvs1 then the weight of the connection between val1 and tvs1
will be the sum of the weights of the edges between val1 and
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Optimal features of U2R category (less than the mean of the CC value).each feature categorical value {vali∃vali ∈ tvs1} of tvs1. These
weights are the edge weights represented in weighted graph
WG. The transpose of the matrix A is A′ (see Table 3).
Find prerogative weights by aggregating each row of A′
(a matrix v that represents the prerogative weights will be
formed).
Now find the pivot weights through matrix multiplication
between A and v.
u = A × v. (7)
Then the fas of feature categorical value fiv j can be measured
as follows
fas( fiv j ) =
|STVS|
k=1
{u(tvsk) : ( fiv j → tvsk) ≠ 0}
|STVS|
k=1
u(tvsk)
. (8)
Then the fas between feature categorical values fiv j and fi ′v j ′
can be measured as follows
fas( fiv j ↔ fi ′v j ′)=
|STVS|
k=1
{u(tvsk)∃( fiv j , fi ′v j ′) ⊂ tvsk}
|STVS|
k=1
u(tvsk)
. (9)
In the above equation descriptions, the |STVS| represents total
number of transaction value sets.
The feature association impact scale (FAIS) of each
transaction value set tvsi can be measured as follows:
fais(tvsi )
= 1−
m
j=1
{fas({val j∃val j ∈ V }) : (val j ⊂ tvsi )}
|tvsi | . (10)
The FAIS threshold faist can be found as follows:
faist =
|STVS|
i=1
fais(tvsi )
|STVS| . (11)
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Canonical correlation of the fields of R2L category under divergent labels against normal data.
Attack category: R2L
Attack type FTP WRITE GUESS PASSWORD IPMAP MULTIHOP PHF SATAN SPY WAREZ CLIENT WAREZ MASTER
Duration 0 0.011374 0 0.9092 0.447214 0.014181 0.663675 0 1
protocol type 0.883883 0.967297 0.903696 0.87831 0.866025 1 0.894427 0.973524 0.92966968
Service 0.321815 0.303572 0.346826 0.287029 0.527506 0.266065 0.720078 0.215949 0.354636861
Flag 0.810931 0.869756 1 0.805823 0.802955 0.882091 0.857493 0.942495 0.869318288
src bytes 0.637815 0.388506 0.493244 0.597609 0.989973 0.010764 0.978258 0.075232 0.18312681
dst bytes 0.967743 0.309517 0.094107 0.415869 0.71357 0.02411 0.999118 0.203639 0.715331926
Land 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
wrong fragment 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Urgent 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Hot 0 0.125 0 0.970269 0.5 0 0 0 0
num failed logins 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
logged in 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.988661 1
num compromised 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
root shell 0 0 0 1 0.5 0 0 0 0
su attempted 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
num root 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
num file creations 0 0 0 0.685994 0 0 0 0 0
num shells 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
num access files 1 0 0 1 0.5 0 1 0 0
num outbound cmds 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
is host login 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
is guest login 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1
Count 0.636775 0.656092 0.522655 0.66571 0.698297 0.641479 0.723356 0.678245 0.670388708
srv count 0.636243 0.666086 0.535262 0.620293 0.717775 0.167174 0.754606 0.644706 0.72429978
serror rate 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
srv serror rate 0 1 0.421042 0 0 0 0 0 0
rerror rate 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0
srv rerror rate 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0
same srv rate 0.984798 0.99765 0.989762 0.982708 0.970725 1 0.948683 1 0.993812023
diff srv rate 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0
srv diff host rate 0 0 0.378165 0 0 0 0 0.045682 0
dst host count 0.692029 0.745901 0.100371 0.418296 0.737716 0.755822 0.928125 0.366917 0.120146782
dst host srv count 0.559688 0.805651 0.795927 0.912457 0.945191 0.210034 0.892864 0.783955 0.75331486
dst host same srv rate 0.968427 0.997687 0.956324 0.841431 0.998623 0.171688 0.996833 0.887309 0.94792623
dst host diff srv rate 0 0 0 0 0.57735 0.085977 0.707107 0 0
dst host same src port rate 0.43049 0.416211 0.315129 0.452633 0 0.179867 0 0.375513 0.32159335
dst host srv diff host rate 0.359734 0.044368 0 0 0 0 0 0.50144 0
dst host serror rate 0 0.041338 0.254121 0 0 1 0.707107 1 1
dst host srv serror rate 0 0.032949 0.254121 0 0 0 0.695795 0 0
dst host rerror rate 0 0.143514 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
dst host srv rerror rate 0.342997 0.143514 0 1 0 1 1 0 0In the above equation |STVS| indicates the total number of
transaction value sets
The standard deviation of the fais of each transaction
value set needs to be measured further, to estimate the low,
medium and high ranges of faist. The mathematical notation
of estimating standard deviation is as follows:
sdvfaist =

|STVS|
i=1
(fais(tvsi )− faist)2

(|STVS| − 1) . (12)
The FAIS range can be explored as follows:
The lower threshold of faist range is
faistl = faist − sdvfaist. (13)The higher threshold of faist range is
faisth = faist + sdvfaist. (14)
A network transaction nt can be said as safe if and only if
fais(nt) < faistl .
A network transaction nt can be said as suspected to be an
intrusion if and only if fais(nt) ≥ faistl&&fais(nt) < faisth .
The network transaction nt can be confirmed as intrusion if
fais(nt) ≥ faisth .
6. Results
The canonical correlation is applied on the IDS data set ex-
plored in Section 4.3, which is carried out by using expression
language R. The data preprocessing is performed using JAVA.
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Optimal features of R2L category (less than the mean of the CC value).The canonical correlation of different fields under divergent la-
bels is explored in Fig. 3 and Tables 4–11 (see Appendix A).
Total records tested were 25% of actual data set (20% of
selected test records are of each category called Probe, DOS,
U2R, R2L and Normal records) and CC threshold is considered
in the range of lower bound (the difference between CC averageand standard deviation of CC) and upper bound (the sum of CC
average and standard deviation of CC).
Total number of records found to be normal are 19.8% of
test data records (false negative are 4.7% (intruded transactions
are falsely claimed as normal) and true negatives are 15.1%
(normal transactions truly claimed as normal)).
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Precision, recall and F-measure values found from the results of the empirical analysis.
Precision Recall F-measure
Less than the lower bound of CC threshold 0.98 0.99 0.984974619
Less than the CC threshold 0.985 0.985 0.985
Less than the upper bound of CC threshold 0.989 0.987 0.987998988Total number of records found to be intruded are 80.2%
(intruded transactions claimed truly as intruded are 75.3%
of test data records (true positives) and normal records are
claimed falsely as intruded are 4.9% of test data records (false
positives)).
As per the results explored, the proposed model is accurate
to the level of 90.4%. The failure percentage is 9.6%.
The experiments are also conducted on the same data set us-
ing model called Anomaly based network intrusion detection
through assessing feature association impact scale, and the ex-
plored results indicate that this model is also scalable and robust
towards forecasting the intrusion scope of a network transaction
(observed detection accuracy is approx. 91%), but the major
obstacle observed in earlier model compared to the proposed
model is process complexity. This is due to the number of fea-
tures opted to assess the scale is drastically minimized in the
proposed model than our earlier model and at the same time the
model proposed preserves its accuracy towards intrusion detec-
tion (see Figs. 6 and 7).
As per these results, the accuracy of the proposal of opti-
mizing feature set using canonical correlation (FCAAIS) mini-
mizes the process complexity of the FAIS.
The observed time complexity is scalable since the comple-
tion time is not compliment to the ratio of features count, which
is due to higher CC threshold (see Fig. 4).
Hence, it is obvious to conclude that the applying canonical
correlation towards optimized attribute selection is significant
to boost the FAIS model (see Table 12).
The intrusion detection accuracy (the percentage of valid
predictions by the proposed method) is used as the main per-
formance measure. In addition to accuracy, we used precision,
recall, and F-measure to measure the performance (see Fig. 5).
7. Conclusion
It is desirable for anomaly based IDSs to achieve high classi-
fication accuracy, and meanwhile reduce the complexity of the
rules that are extracted from training data. Owing to the fact that
the accuracy and interpretability are often contradictory in the
optimization process, we proposed canonical correlation anal-
ysis to optimize the features towards detecting the intrusions.
The selection of optimal features simplifies the process of FAIS
which is used in our earlier research article. The experiments
were done using a benchmark data set. The results demonstrate
the canonical correlation analysis is promising and significant
to select optimal attributes of the network transactions used for
training. Furthermore the proposed model minimized the pro-
cess complexity and completion time and retains the maximal
prediction accuracy.Appendix
See Tables 4–11.
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